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COMPETITION POLICY: THE
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
ELEANOR M. FOX*
I
INTRODUCTION
Most developing countries now have competition laws.1 They, like all
countries, face questions of design for their national laws and for their connection
to the world.
This article argues, perhaps surprisingly, that developing countries have a
comparative advantage in designing competition systems that are well adapted to
their nations and to the modern world. Into the thick forest of enormous
handicaps of developing countries,2 this article shines a light on two points at
which developing countries’ incentives are better aligned than those of developed
countries with positive development of the law. The sole burden of this article is
to uncover these two points of light.
The subject can be separated into two parts: inward-looking—developing a
sound national system, and outward-looking—developing a system for the
connectivity of national markets to their regional and international environment.
For the inward-looking phase, this article observes that developing countries are
not constrained by path dependence in designing and implementing a
competition law because their competition systems are sufficiently young and
unformed. Without the baggage of law-on-the-books, these countries have a clear
path to choose their overall goal for controlling market power and its abuses and
the route to get there, informed as they wish by existing models. They have the
unencumbered opportunity to build a system based on what conduct harms them
the most. They can define important but elastic concepts such as “efficiency” in

Copyright © 2016 by Eleanor M. Fox.
This article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
*Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University School of Law. The
author thanks Tim Büthe and Umut Aydin for their extraordinarily helpful suggestions. She thanks the
Filomen M. D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund for generous support.
1. See Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: Explaining
Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at
2.
2. See, e.g., Aditya Bhattacharjea, Who Needs Antitrust? Or, Is Developing Country Antitrust
Different? A Historical Comparative Analysis, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 52 (D. Sokol,
T. Cheng & I. Lianos eds., 2013) [hereinafter Who Needs Antitrust?]; see generally A.E. Rodriguez &
Ashok Menon, Understanding the Nature of Competition Agency Ineffectiveness, 79 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 4, 2016 (discussing hurdles developing countries face in implementing competition laws).
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their own terms. In tailoring law to their needs, they have a flexibility
unconstrained by path dependence.3
This article makes a similar but different claim regarding the outward-looking
aspects of developing countries’ competition regimes. The claim is even more
dramatic: Developing countries are better incentivized than are developed
countries to craft workable solutions at the trade-and-competition interface in
both regional arrangements and the world system. The argument starts from the
observation that a huge swath of their market problems are cross-border
problems, and that law and norms would ideally be commensurate with the scope
of the affected market. The developed world is straight-jacketed or blindered
from addressing the problems that arise from the gap between global markets
and national-only competition regimes. A century of strategies fueled by vested
interests keeps vision at a national level. In contrast, developing countries cannot
afford to ignore trade-and-competition problems. Whereas the United States
(the principal developed country example used throughout this article)4
functionally segregates the disciplines of trade and of competition and even
cultivates their separateness,5 developing countries feel the immediate impact of
restraints on competition, trade, and investment—local and foreign, public and
private—as one juggernaut.6 They naturally develop integrated visions. For them,
world connectivity requires an integrated vision.
To say that developing countries face better incentives than do developed
countries to consider workable solutions does not mean that they will design and
pursue the better solutions. They face severe hurdles. Not least are lack of
resources and human capital, as well as the political and economic contexts of
their nations, which often include deeply embedded corruption and lack of
trustworthy institutions.7 But the existence of hurdles does not detract from the
fact of comparative advantage. This article is about the comparative advantages.

3. In keeping with its discrete confines, this article does not imply that developing countries are
existentially free. Often they are saddled with histories of autocratic government, corruption, a privileged
elite. See, e.g., MICHELA WRONG, IT’S OUR TURN TO EAT: THE STORY OF A KENYAN
WHISTLEBLOWER (2009) (portraying a tradition where the regime in power lavished corrupt benefits on
their own). Merely, given all of their handicaps, they do not also have the baggage of scores of years of
specific competition law in place. They are free of this baggage.
4. The United States’ model is one of the two dominant models for antitrust in the world. It is not
always in sympathy with the other dominant model, the European Union’s. In matters of unilateral
conduct, U. S. law is more permissive.
5. See, e.g., I.M. Destler, U.S. Approach to International Competition Policy, in BROOKINGS
TRADE FORUM 2006 395, 415–16 (2006).
6. Even their vested interests have a stake in supra-national norms that would limit multinational
power.
7. See Michal S. Gal & Eleanor M. Fox, Drafting Competition Law for Developing Jurisdictions:
Learning from Experience, in THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS:
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW 296, 304 (Michal S. Gal et al. eds., 2015).
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II
DESIGNING NATIONAL LAW FIT FOR DEVELOPMENT
Developing countries are at many different stages of implementing
competition law and policy. Some competition authorities, such as several in
West Africa, are at earlier stages of development and may operate as ad hoc price
control agencies when prices rise. Others are more mature and apply competition
law principles credibly.8 Many of these agencies are still young agencies working
to make their law relevant to their economies and people.9 Their law is still
unformed or at least malleable.
This part is addressed especially to young agencies whose law is unformed or
malleable. The message is: The competition authorities and their nations have a
unique opportunity to design the path of their law. They have the opportunity to
consider what is good for their country, which usually means the implementation
of rules of law that promote sustainable inclusive development and prioritize
concerns of the poor. They have the opportunity to consider the wheel that has
already been invented (developed country law), as well as to ask their own
foundational questions in constructing new trade and competition regimes.
Developed countries, too, of course, can change their laws to adjust to new
environments, but path dependence makes change more difficult.10
Why should developing countries not just reproduce the wheel and simplify
the flow of commerce in the world? The answer to the question requires
reflection on economic law, its portability, and its fit.
Competition law is economic law. It is about markets and market failures.
Economics must be generalized to make the law administrable. In competition
law, economics is generalized to fit the character of the markets, both in view of
how well the markets work to produce the goods and services people want and
to serve other goals that markets serve, such as to provide an environment for
business people to succeed on their merits.
In the United States, markets work quite well. Capital markets and venture
capital are available to fund promising new ideas. There is not a history of statism
and privilege. Entry and expansion to challenge incumbent economic power are
relatively robust. There are few monopolies, and even fewer that are invulnerable

8. See Mor Bakhoum, Etude Sur La Révision du Cadre Institutionnel de Mise En Oeuvre des
Règles Communautaires de Concurrence de l’UEMOA, Final Report, March 14, 2012, at point 2 and
throughout.
9. See discussion below suggesting that the U.S. paradigm for its monopoly law, which privileges
the dominant firm’s freedom to act over a duty to avoid squeezing out competitors, may not work for the
people of developing countries.
10. For example, Australia’s competition law, adopted in 1974, amended in 2010, contains an
outmoded provision on misuse of market power. For at least 20 years, policymakers have been seeking
an amendment to bring the law in line with international standards by providing an effects test. Possibly,
a pending bill to do so will finally pass. See Katharine Kemp, Uncovering the Roots of Australia’s Misuse
of Market Power Provision: Is It Time to Reconsider?, 42 AUSTRL. BUS. L. REV. 329 (2014). The fact that
it is more difficult to change a path than to chart a course does not mean that reform does not occur. It
occurs all of the time.
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to challenge by good competitors. Inequality of economic opportunity is a
national social and economic problem but not one acknowledged by the
competition system. Lack of mobility is recognized in the denial.11
Trust in markets and distrust of government form the foundational base upon
which U.S. antitrust rules and standards have been forged since the early 1980s.
The rules and standards can be characterized as follows: There are strong rules
against hard-core cartels, which are principally price-fixing conspiracies. There
are standards to identify anti-competitive mergers, but few mergers are found
anti-competitive and even fewer enjoined. Monopoly conduct is seldom found;
U.S. courts worry more about possible harm to consumers from chilling
investment if the court should condemn exclusionary conduct than about actual
harm to consumers and feisty competitors if the court approves exclusionary
conduct.12
In developing countries, the foundation is entirely different, and, in many
respects, is the converse.13 In general, markets do not work well. Most major
businesses grew up as state-owned entities with an abundance of privileges. 14
Capital markets work poorly and often not at all for people without wealth and
connections. Barriers to entry are high, in part due to the persistence of privileged
monopolies. Severe poverty and corruption are the norm. Inequality of wealth,
power, and economic opportunity is pervasive and often acknowledged as
creating problems all disciplines of law must address. Personal mobility may be
almost non-existent.15

11. See Michael W. Kraus, Shai Davidai & A. David Nussbaum, American Dream? Or Mirage?,
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/opinion/sunday/american-dream-ormirage.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/BLM5-CWBY]; Eduardo Porter, With Competition in Tatters, the
Rip of Inequality Widens, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/
business/economy/antitrust-competition-inequality.html [https://perma.cc/UMZ4-N4F3]. While most
American writers brush off the claim that antitrust and its lack of enforcement can be part of the
equality/mobility problem, developing countries tend to explore the link. For example, the Fourth
International Competition Conference of the BRICS countries in November 2015 featured the issue,
“How competition policy interfaces with the policy challenges of inequality and inclusive growth.” See
BRICS
INT’L
COMPETITION
CONF.,
Competition
and
Inclusive
Growth,
4TH
http://www.gov.za/speeches/4th-interntational-brics-competition-commission-conference-9-nov-20151532 [https://perma.cc/B5BA-55JW].
12. See, e.g., Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 n.4 (2004).
See Eleanor Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE
EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77, 80 (R. Pitofsky, ed., 2008)
[hereinafter Efficiency Paradox].
13. See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 2; Bhattacharjea, supra note 2; Rodriguez & Menon, supra
note 2, at 38.
14. See Santiago Levy & Michael Walton, Equity, Competition, and Growth in Mexico: An
Overview, in NO GROWTH WITHOUT EQUITY? INEQUALITY, INTERESTS, AND COMPETITION IN
MEXICO 1 (Levy & Walton eds. 2009); Philippe Brusick & Simon J. Evenett, Should Developing
Countries Worry About Abuse of Dominant Power?, 2008 WISC. L. REV. 269 (2008); Eleanor Fox,
Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 211, 229–30
(2007).
15. See Levy & Walton, supra note 14, at 1; Brusick & Evenett, supra note 14; Fox, supra note 14,
at 229–30.
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The contrast holds a message: There is no reason to believe that the
competition rules and standards that are good for America are good for
developing countries. American rules may be good for developing countries, and
many are. But the stark contrast of the economic realities in developing countries
as compared with those in developed countries such as the United States is at
least an invitation to question portability of Western law. Should the
foundational stage be reset in some respects? The following subjects might
inform the answer:
A. Formulating the goals of competition law and strategies to achieve them
B. Defining “efficiency”
C. Choosing a genre of economics: Chicago School? Post-Chicago? A third
alternative?
D. Dealing with:
1.
State restraints
2.
Exclusionary practices
3.
Exploitation, especially severe exploitation by providers of
necessities of life
4.
Fairness as a factor in determining what is anti-competitive
5.
Public interest as a trump over what is anti-competitive
The treatment of these subjects forms part of the foundation for competition
law that fits development. In considering each of them, this article starts with the
perspective of the United States and then asks what perspective developing
countries might be likely to choose if they start with a clean slate and ask what
would be good for them as they seek to grow a robust economy and legitimate
framework of law.
A. Goals And Strategies To Achieve Them
For the United States, the goal of competition law as most commonly stated
is consumer welfare or efficiency, and the way to achieve it is to analyze conduct
or transactions to determine whether they reduce output and consumer surplus.16
Only if output will probably be reduced and consumer surplus thus decreased will
the conduct or transaction be labeled anti-competitive.17 Consumer surplus refers
to the aggregate surplus of all consumers. It is considered irrelevant, for
competition law, if the business practices in question benefit rich consumers more
than poor consumers, or even if the rich gain at the expense of the poor. Using
the Kaldor-Hicks principle,18 if winners gain more than losers lose, the conduct is

16. See Fox, Efficiency Paradox, supra note 12.
17. The European Union has a broader view of goals, including market integration. It puts more
stress on preserving the process of competition and thus on market access. See Eleanor Fox,
Monopolization and abuse of dominance: Why Europe is different, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 129 (2014).
18. See, e.g., Pareto Improvements and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency Criterion, RECKON,
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efficient. If the winners are well off and the losers are poor and suffering from
years of blocked opportunity, that is irrelevant. And if dominant firm strategies
squeeze newcomers from the market by the power and leverage of incumbency,
that is not an antitrust violation unless the conduct is likely to result in
monopolization of a market with attendant lessening of aggregate consumer
surplus.19
For developing countries, the overall goal is likely to be development, en
route to a more robust economy and a better life for the people.20 In keeping with
the imperative to include the masses of people typically left out and left behind,
both for humane reasons and for efficient sustainable development, the goal may
be articulated as inclusive sustainable development. Distribution and human
dignity matter. More nearly equal opportunity to contest markets on the merits
is an objective—and usually an efficient one.21
How can a nation reach the goal of sustainable, efficient development
through markets? It might approach the challenge by keeping markets open and
accessible, while protecting both buyers and suppliers from abusive exercises of
power.
B. What Does “Efficiency” Mean?
For purposes of antitrust, the United States defines efficiency in terms
compatible with the goals statement above. Moreover, the antitrust rules and
standards are based on various assumptions about efficiency, including: markets
are generally robust and work well; market power is hard to get and keep;
business firms generally act to please consumers because that is how they make
their profits, and competition forces them to do so; mergers are generally
efficient; vertical restraints (for example, restraints in the course of distributing
products) are generally efficient; and law that prohibits exclusionary conduct and

http://www.reckon.co.uk/open/Pareto_improvements_and_Kaldor-Hicks_efficiency_criterion
[https://perma.cc/GSY2-FM64] (outlining the nature and limitations of the principle).
19. See Fox, Efficiency Paradox, supra note 12; Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 n.4 (2004).
20. This goal may take the form of enhancing GDP growth in general, enhancing performance in
particular sectors, inducing inventiveness of national players, increasing competiveness abroad of
national firms, sparking technologies that have external benefits to a large swath of the population (as in
mobile money transfers), and any combination of these subjects. Such developmental goals, among
others, are further discussed in Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1 at 7–8.
21. When masses of people have been denied the right to engage in markets, opening the gates to
their entry is bound to result in productive new enterprise and thus increase the size of the economic pie
(efficiency) as well as to expand the constituency of market actors (inclusive development, producing
legitimacy). See ELEANOR FOX, “MAKING MARKETS WORK FOR PEOPLE” AS A POST-MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT
GOAL
(2015),
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Contribution/CCPB_7RC2015_
HLRTCompSusDev_Fox_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7BD-GHH8]. See also Bhattacharjea, supra note 2,
at 52–53 (arguing that modern notions of development entail “expansion of human capabilities,” and that
antitrust in developing countries, if it is adopted, should prioritize issues “in sectors that directly impinge
on the well-being of the poor, in particular essential consumer goods, agriculture, and health care”).
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vertical restraints has a high probability of blocking efficiencies and protecting
inefficient competitors.22
The economic realities of developing countries are materially different.
Markets are not robust. Business is often state-owned and subsidized, and the
beneficiary of numerous privileges.23 Efficient market assumptions are
inconsistent with economic reality. Opportunity for business to enter markets,
survive, and grow is likely to be a basic ingredient of developing countries’ routes
to efficiency. Thus a grass-roots conception of efficiency and how to reach it may
be quite different for developing countries on the one hand and (at least) for the
United States on the other hand.24
C. What Genre Of Economics Is Most Fitting?
In implementing economic law, countries’ officials and courts usually
embrace one or another strand of economic thought. Each genre of economics
has identifying characteristics in the antitrust space. Chicago School economics
generally would rely on markets and shrink the scope for government
intervention such as antitrust enforcement. In antitrust, Chicago School is closely
associated with the goal of maximizing aggregate consumer welfare or efficiency,
and doing so by letting markets work—even if they are concentrated markets
with dominant firms. Proponents are committed to no antitrust intervention
against conduct or transactions unless they decrease consumer surplus and are
not justified by a good business purpose. Chicago School teachings substantially
helped drive U.S. antitrust law to its current position of relative laissez-faire for
all but hard-core cartels.
Post-Chicago School abandons the Chicago School’s assumptions that
markets work very well, that private enterprise cannot amass meaningful
economic power without government help, and that antitrust enforcement is
likely to cause more harm than good. Driven by facts and evidence, not just
theory, it is much more likely than Chicago School analysis to recognize market
power and its use to increase market power. Post-Chicago antitrust economics
has been a tempering force that supports more antitrust enforcement, but it still

22. European Union law does not adopt these assumptions. See generally Fox, Monopolization,
supra note 17.
23. See, e.g., R.S. KHEMANI, COMPETITION POLICY AND PROMOTION OF INVESTMENT,
ECONOMIC GROUWTH, AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 10–13 (2007),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/397801468174885108/pdf/413340FIAS1Competition1Policy
01PUBLIC1.pdf [https://perma.cc/39UF-4LPM]; Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 2, 21–26; see generally
William E. Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition Systems: Explaining Variation
in the Implementation of New Regimes, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4, 2016. See also Rodriguez &
Menon, supra note 2, at 40.
24. See David J. Gerber, Economic Development and Global Competition Law Convergence, in
COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 13 (Sokol, Cheng & Lianos, eds. 2013); Eleanor Fox,
Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a Competition Law fit for Developing
Countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 273,
274–86 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2012).
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adopts the same consumer welfare/aggregate efficiency paradigm.25 Many
elements and insights of both Chicago and Post-Chicago are relevant to
developing countries; but a country that wants efficient inclusive development is
not likely to embrace either one as its sole guiding light. It may include openness
and market access for people without power in its template of how to make
markets work for its people.26
D. Dealing With:
1. State Restraints
The United States’ substantive antitrust law does not cover acts of the State,
no matter how anti-competitive, on grounds that the State is sovereign and that
the question of State restraints is a political one to be dealt with by the democratic
process.27 U.S. business firms have grown from private initiative. The State never
had a large role in the American economy. Neither the State as business actor
nor abuse of state power to impair the market was ever a perceptible problem in
the United States.
Developing countries have exactly the converse experience. Most or many of
their economies were statist for years, and still are run by a handful of companies
that are either owned or controlled by the State, or a handful of elite families with
strong ties to the State. Many of these businesses remain monopolies even after
privatization.28 State and local government restraints, often interwoven with
private restraints, hamper businesses from competing on their merits. This
different economic history and its aftermath may suggest a greater need and thus
a greater scope for competition law coverage. This imperative is in fact reflected
in the law of a number of transitional and developing countries.29

25. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 257 (2001).
26. See Fatsani Banda et al., Key Debates in Competition, Capabilities development and related
policies: Drawing the Link Between Barriers to Entry and Inclusive Growth (Ctr. for Competition, Reg.
and Econ. Dev., Working Paper No. 1, 2015), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/
52246331e4b0a46e5f1b8ce5/t/55b87b2ee4b09cfa0b9da179/1438153518802/CCRED+Working+Paper+4_
2015_BTE+Review+Paper+1+BandaRobbRobertsVilakazi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34J7-9TB7]
(highlighting entry conditions and the innovation potential of the economically marginalized).
27. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 353 (1943) (holding that acts of state officers are not subject
to the Sherman Act); see also N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015)
(acknowledging Sherman Act immunity of the State when it exercises its sovereign powers). The
European countries have a background of state intervention and European Union law may be a model
for law controlling state anti-competitive measures. See Fox, Monopolization, supra note 17.
28. See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and Competition Policy, in COMPETITION AND THE STATE
15 (Chang, Lianos & Sokol eds., 2014); Brusick & Evenett, supra note 14, at 276; Eleanor Fox & Deborah
Healey, When the State Harms Competition—The Role for Competition Law, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 769,
772–73 (2014).
29. See UNCTAD RESEARCH PARTNERSHIP PLATFORM, COMPETITION LAW AND THE STATE
VOL. 2, APPENDIX OF SAMPLE STATUTORY EXCERPTS (2015), http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/ditcclp2015d6_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BST6-MD73] (providing excerpts from
competition statutes of China, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Spain, and others).
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2. Exclusionary Practices
In the United States, many large firms, even dominant firms, engage in
practices such as tying, exclusive dealing, loyalty rebates, and refusals to deal that
have an exclusionary effect but also, arguably, may protect firm efficiencies and
may benefit some consumers. Under U.S. competition law, as currently
interpreted, it is hard to prove that exclusionary practices harm consumers, and
not so hard to establish that the practices have consumer/efficiency benefits.30
Practices that have an exclusionary effect on rivals are often not impugned under
U.S. antitrust law unless they exclude an equally efficient competitor and have
no significant efficiency justifications.31
In developing countries, usually there is no competitor as efficient as the
dominant firm. Under U.S. principles, entrepreneurs with great ideas, even ones
that have been accepted in the marketplace, might be fenced out of markets by
dominant firm strategies with impunity. 32 U.S. law is especially concerned with
avoiding errors of antitrust intervention.33 Developing countries might prefer to
prioritize the task of keeping markets open to the new blood and ideas that might
infuse it.
3. Exploitation, Especially Severe Exploitation by Providers of Necessities of
Life
In the United States, the antitrust law does not condemn simple
exploitation—charging an excessive price. The market is expected to correct this
problem (the high price, it is hoped, will attract new entry), and the prospect of
an antitrust authority or court acting as price regulator is abhorred.34
Elsewhere in the world, a large number of competition laws prohibit excessive
pricing.35 In developing countries, the prospect of people dying for lack of
affordable drugs is more feared than the prospect of court error of intervention.36
Thus, in the United States, the hedge fund operator Shkreli could, with antitrust
impunity, buy producers of life-savings drugs and raise the price 5000%, from
30. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Comm. Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (holding price
squeeze of independent firm by dominant, vertically integrated firm lawful); Cascade Health Solutions
v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding rebates by dominant firm to its large customers
based on their fidelity in buying almost all of their needs from the dominant firm lawful).
31. See Pac. Bell Telephone, 555 U.S. 438; Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d 883.
32. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (decrying exoneration of a major tobacco company’s year-long below-cost
pricing campaign targeted at the inventor and marketer of low-priced unbranded cigarettes).
33. See Pac. Bell Telephone, 555 U.S. at 457 (reflecting concern that antitrust enforcement will chill
aggressive competition).
34. See Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
35. See Jörg Philipp Terhechte, Excessive Pricing and the Goals of Competition Law, in THE GOALS
OF COMPETITION LAW 371, 374–76 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 2012).
36. See GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS: NOTE BY SOUTH AFRICA, OECD DIRECTORATE FOR FIN.
&
ENTERPRISE
AFF.
COMPETITION
COMMITTEE
3–5
(2014),
http://www.oecd.org/
officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2014)68&docLanguage=En
[https://perma.cc/NKN3-LR37] (discussing Hazel Tau v. GlaxoSmithKline, regarding the excessive price
for AIDS/HIV drugs during the AIDS crisis in South Africa).
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$13.50 to $750 a pill.37 In most developing countries, that strategy would be
outright illegal.
4. Fairness as a Factor in Determining What is Anti-Competitive
In the United States, fairness is neither a recognized goal nor a permissible
consideration of the antitrust law.38 Rather, the law is about efficiency.
Application of elements of fairness, it is feared, will protect inefficient small
business and raise prices to consumers. Thus, fairness is at war with antitrust.39
To many developing countries the deep problem of fairness cannot be
avoided. Business, society, and the law have been unfair to the poor and to the
left-out and unconnected majority for many years. Injustices need to be righted,
for efficiency and for humanity. Competition law cannot do everything, but at
least it can provide an environment in which the left-out population has a fair
chance to compete and smaller producers are not exploited by exercises of
market power. Developing countries are looking for ways to make their law
responsive to and alleviative of poverty, inequality, and past injustices of
exclusion from economic life. Whereas U.S. antitrust law leans towards
protecting the dominant firms and their strategies on the assumption that
intervention is inefficient,40 developing countries may prefer a strategy of keeping
a clear path for the outsider—a route that has strong efficiency properties and is
fair as well.
5. Public Interest as a Trump Over What is Anti-Competitive
U.S. antitrust law does not admit consideration of “the public interest,” on
grounds that public interest is an amorphous concept and likely to detract from
efficiency. What is in the public interest can vary with the decision maker.
Discretionary use of the factor, it is thought, muddies the waters of “pure”
antitrust, and is likely to bring inefficiencies into the law and harm consumers.41
In many developing countries, such as South Africa and many sub-Saharan
African countries, disregarding public interest is not an option. Without room to
account for the public interest, for example in protecting jobs and empowering
the formerly excluded and disadvantaged black population, there would be no

37. Although the United States has no antitrust provision against excessive pricing, the Federal
Trade Commission opened an investigation into the matter. See Nate Raymond & David Ingram,
Exclusive: U.S. FTC probes Turing over drug prices Shkreli’s lawyer says, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-shkreli-idUSKCN0V026V [https://perma.cc/VV7P-S3DU].
38. See David J. Gerber, Fairness In Competition Law: European and U.S. Experience, Presentation
at Conference on Fairness and Asian Competition Laws 4 (Mar. 5, 2004), http://archive.
kyotogakuen.ac.jp/o_ied/information/fairness_in_competition_law.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F3M-9TVL].
39. Id.
40. See Pac. Bell Telephone Co. v. LinkLine Comm. Inc. 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009); Verizon Comm.
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004). See generally Eleanor Fox, Efficiency
Paradox, supra note 12.
41. See Harry First & Eleanor Fox, Philadelphia National Bank, Globalization, and the Public
Interest, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 319–28 (2015).
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competition law; the legislature would not have enacted it.42 Developing
countries therefore might choose to include a public interest factor in their law,
and many do. To address the problem of discretionary bounds that attend a
public interest component, countries that include the component can specify
what counts as a public interest and can provide a transparent process for vetting
public interest claims.43
***
These eight differences of perspective are not minor; they are notable.44
In sum, developing countries have the unencumbered opportunity to follow
their own path; to adopt law that is suited to them, that is most likely to take root,
and most likely to help them fulfill their goals. They are well positioned to design
and follow a path suitable to economic development in the twenty-first century,
taking into account the demands of openness and inclusiveness.45
III
DESIGNING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL NORMS
The world is in need of economic coherence. Competition law is national law,
but the problems it addresses are global. There may be more than 130 national
competition systems,46 and systems may collide. Other disciplines of law are
brought into coherence with international frameworks, often under the aegis of
the World Trade Organization;47 but the nations have thus far resisted an
international framework for competition.48 The substantial failure of the WTO

42. For South Africa, see DAVID LEWIS, THIEVES AT THE DINNER TABLE: ENFORCING THE
COMPETITION ACT 40–43 (2012). Moreover, as Aditya Bhattacharjea points out, developing countries
generally “lack unemployment and social security benefits. Without such safety nets, it is difficult for
policy makers and judges to privilege economic efficiency to the complete exclusion of concerns about
unemployment, which is an inescapable consequence of vigorous competition.” Bhattacharjea, supra
note 2, at 58.
43. See First & Fox, supra note 41, at 350–51 (recommending specificity and transparency).
44. For analysis regarding how these fundamental differences in perspective might inform the
formulation of competition law, see Eleanor Fox, Competition, development, and regional integration: in
search of a competition law for developing countries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND REGIONAL
INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 273 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2012).
45. See Ronald Inglehart, Why Equality Will Likely Make a Comeback, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb.
2016 at 2, 10 (arguing that increasing inequality of wealth and opportunity accruing to the benefit of small
elites, and increasing discontent of the masses in view of precarious employment futures, may mobilize
popular majorities to reduce inequalities). See also Francois Bourguignon, How the Rich get Richer as the
Poor Catch Up, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2016 at 11, 15 (detailing the growing inequality of wealth within
nations, despite reductions in global inequality as certain large developing countries grow their own
elites, and suggesting means to close the gaps; otherwise “disenchanted citizens will misguidedly resist
further attempts to integrate the world’s economies”).
46. Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 2.
47. See Richard Samans et al., Strengthening The Global Trade and Investment System in The 21st
Century, E15 INITIATIVE (Jan. 2016), http://e15initiative.org/publications/executive-summary-synthesisreport-full-report/ [https://perma.cc/3KFQ-9EKT].
48. See Eleanor Fox, Antitrust Without Borders: From Roots to Codes to Networks, E15 INITIATIVE
(2015), http://e15initiative.org/publications/antitrust-without-borders-from-roots-to-codes-to-networks/
[https://perma.cc/5Q8R-ZJV8].
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Doha trade round signals low expectations for movement towards a competition
agenda in the WTO in the foreseeable future. Regional agreements and
collaborations are regarded as the hope for coherence.
A. Regional Norms
The developed world, and particularly the United States, has little incentive
to include enforceable competition obligations or trade-and-competition bridges
in regional agreements. The United States likes its own competition law; it has
no trouble enforcing its law even against foreigners; and it does not want its
antitrust principles eroded at a supra-national bargaining table, which could vote
to protect smaller competitors from efficient competition.49 The competition
provisions in regional agreements that include the United States are thus far thin
and not enforceable.50 The North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994
provides an example. The Agreement includes a competition chapter, which
expressly required further work by the three nations—the United States, Canada,
and Mexico.51 No report or recommendations were ever submitted. The nations
could not even agree to prohibit export cartels within North America. Nor could
they agree to abolish their antidumping laws and substitute predatory pricing
rules, just within the three-nation area. Why? The United States, for one, gets
little economic benefit from competition chapters in regional agreements that it
cannot get for itself52 and it has no incentive to lay down its strategic arms.53
The story is entirely different for developing countries. They have many
competition problems they cannot solve alone. Their incentives align with the
construction of regional agreements, especially with like-minded neighbors.
There are six market-restraint problems that developing countries face and
that regional agreements with similarly situated neighbors can significantly help
to resolve. Some of them overlap.
The first is economies of scale in enforcement. Each economy may be too
small to finance and staff a robust competition authority on its own. Banding
together may help to close the resource gap if member states are willing to
commit sufficient resources to the pool.
The second is strength in numbers. Each country alone may lack the practical
power to resist anti-competitive acts launched from abroad, or to call the
perpetrators to account. Together, but not alone, developing countries might be
able to induce developed countries to share documents critical to proving a case,

49. Id.
50. The United States supports a competition chapter in regional agreements, but without an
enforcement mechanism.
51. See North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289, Art. 1504 (1993).
52. For example, it can enjoin an off-shore merger and it can stop an off-shore cartel. The offenders
will comply with its commands because they want to do business in the U.S. market.
53. It might, however, derive foreign policy benefits, as the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership
demonstrates. See, e.g., Bernard K. Gordon, Trading Up in Asia: Why the United States Needs the TransPacific Partnership, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 2012, at 1717.
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and perhaps even to convince the countries at the site of the offense to prohibit
their firms from price-fixing in developing countries.
Third is voice to articulate developing countries’ common cause. Without
some unity there is no developing country perspective; merely, there are many
fragmented voices barely audible in the global conversation. Each developing
country alone cannot convincingly assert a developing country perspective, but
all would profit by doing so, in a world in which developed countries argue that
the world needs common standards and that the standard should be theirs.54
Fourth is information and region-wide understanding of the facts. A regional
authority or watchdog may be better positioned to detect and fit together the
puzzle of restraints that transcend borders.55 It can take a view from the top that
better sees, understands, and accounts for all harm and benefits, wherever they
fall. The more inclusive vision may enable more focused and more powerful
advocacy to tear down internal border barriers, by raising the discourse to the
community level and calculating the costs of border restraints.56
Fifth, like the European Union, an economic community can surmount
parochialism within its internal market, prohibiting discrimination in favor of a
country’s own national enterprises, and prohibiting states from imposing undue
restraints in the internal market. State and private restraints are two sides to the
same coin; community illuminates this truth.57
Sixth, as exemplified by the European Union, the community is often an
economic market, and enforcement and remedy orders are much more efficient
and effective on a market-wide basis as compared with a fragmented one. An
effective remedy in competition cases must often be region-wide.

54. Thus, the developing country view lost out in the International Competition Network
discussions that led to formulating recommended practices for proof of substantial market power. See
Eleanor Fox, Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 43 INT’L L. 151, 170 (2009)
(reporting how the ICN rejected large market share as a proxy for economic power and endorsed the
need for complex proof). David Lewis, then chair of the South African Competition Tribunal, made the
argument (as paraphrased): that developing countries cannot bear a heavy burden of proof at this first
stage of proceedings against an apparently dominant firm; that authorities should be able to use market
share as a proxy for market power; and that a rule requiring complex economic evidence and analysis to
determine whether a firm with a high market share was indeed dominant would tend to put beyond the
ability of developing countries’ competition authorities the power to challenge the persistent
monopolistic conduct that blights their economies. Id.
55. See Frederic Jenny, Competition Enforcement in Testing Times: Beyond the National Level,
Pre-ICN Forum on Competition and Development (June 2, 2009) (presenting evidence of a cross-border
market division among beer firms in East Africa), http://slideplayer.fr/slide/5195747/.
56. Cf. Paolo Cecchini et al., THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992: THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE
MARKET (1988) (summarizing results of research project on the “Costs of Non-Europe”). To some
extent the World Bank and the African Competition Forum try to play this role. See World Bank Group
and African Competition Forum, Breaking down barriers: unlocking Africa’s potential through vigorous
competition policy (July 2016), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/243171467232051787/
Breaking-down-barriers-unlocking-Africas-potential-through-vigorous-competition-policy
[https://perma.cc/HGD7-A5E4].
57. See Fox & Healey, supra note 28, at 791–93 (describing the European Union’s integral approach
to hybrid state and private restraints; the law condemns both private cartels and the state’s facilitation of
them).
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Regional entities can become nodes in the larger network of the antitrust
family. These larger units might eventually provide stepping stones to broader
regional frameworks or possibly even establish norms or modules for a global
one.
B. Global Norms
Designing global norms is yet a greater challenge. The world needs
coherence, and developed and developing countries alike would profit from an
objectively reasonable system based on a model of connectedness, and one that
is reasonably free of parochial national interests. Such a model would
contemplate more nearly open markets consistent with WTO norms. It could
prohibit world consensus wrongs, such as hard-core cartels and clear
monopolistic exclusions, subject to justifications that would allow policy space for
developing countries. For mergers, it could provide a clearinghouse for
notification of large multinational mergers, a right of harmed nations to be heard
and of smaller, powerless nations to have their antitrust harms identified and
prevented in the country of the merging parties. For all matters, it could provide
a process by which competition authorities can obtain documents in the home
country of putative offenders, a process for victims of adjudicated wrongs to get
redress from offshore wrongdoers, and, in general, transparency.58 These rules
and modalities are likely to enhance world welfare.
Consider the case of the United States. The United States has no incentive to
embrace such a model because it would be giving up power and gaining almost
nothing. It can protect itself without a global project; it does not need
international competition law. It has a strong system for document discovery and
a strong system for victim recovery. In cases of offshore restraints that hurt U.S.
competition, it has the legal and practical tools and powers to stop bad conduct
and even offshore mergers. Moreover, the United States, like most developed
countries, has the flexibility to retain selective illiberal trade restraints (subsidies
and tariffs that often deprive developing countries of their best routes to efficient
production and sale) as and when they choose.59
Developing countries are vulnerable. They cannot easily protect themselves
from the multitude of off-short restraints that hurt them. International cartels are
the chief culprits. Developing countries benefit from developed country
enforcement when enforcement is good for the developed countries, but there is
no such benefit when the developing countries are the target; and they often are.60
58. See Fox, Antitrust Without Borders, supra note 48; Eduardo Perez Motta, Competition Policy
and Trade in the Global Economy: Towards an Integrated Approach, ICTSD: THE E15 INITIATIVE
(2016), http://e15initiative.org/publications/competition-policy-trade-global-economytowardsintegrated
-approach/ [https://perma.cc/NL92-QQQN]; Ralf Michaels, Lending Out Antitrust, 79 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. no. 4, 2016, at 246 (identifying a compatible solution: redress in the courts of the offenders). See
also Bhattacharjea, supra note 2, at 64 (making a similar proposal while noting that U.S. law has
“effectively foreclosed” this approach).
59. See MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 212–18 (2004).
60. See Pradeep Mehta, Airline Cartel Fines Could be Better Used, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2007),
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Although the United States functionally separates its trade from its
competition policy, and thus can shy away from an international competition
framework while benefiting from a global trade regime, developing countries do
not have that luxury. Especially in smaller developing countries, the worst
restraints are usually integral, public and private, which means that they need a
regime that controls state and private anti-competitive acts beyond their
borders.61
Because a fair cosmopolitan community is so important to successful
development of developing countries, and because developed countries are
largely content with the way it is, developing countries have stronger incentives
to facilitate a world architecture.62
IV
CONCLUSION
Developing countries are encumbered by countless disadvantages. In the
midst of all of their sometimes insurmountable challenges, this article has
uncovered two bright but hidden truths. First, path dependence. Mature
competition jurisdictions have the baggage of an entrenched path, which is
sometimes inflexible even in times of global change. New competition
jurisdictions do not have this baggage. Developing jurisdictions with unformed
competition law are well positioned to take advantage of this insight. They are
free to address their own needs and need not be seduced to transplant law
tailored to markets very different from their own. Most principles of law of
developed jurisdictions are compatible with developing countries’ needs, but
some are not, and some issues critical to developing countries’ own
competitiveness, such as state-related dominant firm restraints, may go ignored.
Second, the trade-and-competition interface. Developed economies with large
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/282bf10c-7b82-11dc-8c53-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz42RR6zE24
(explaining that developing country victims are often unable to recover compensation); Pradeep Mehta,
BUS.
LINE
(Sept.
17,
2013),
Singed
by
the
Potash
Cartel,
HINDU
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/singed-by-the-potash-cartel/article5138520.ece
[https://perma.cc/GDQ9-UYRH] (describing the potash cartel’s devastating impact on developing
countries).
61. An example is the potash export cartel stemming from Canada and hurting especially farmers
in Africa, for potash is a main ingredient of fertilizers they need. The cartel was endorsed by the
government of Canada in support of the province Saskatchewan. Mehta, Singed by the Potash Cartel,
supra note 60; Michael Trebilcock, Cartel Hypocrisy: Canada opposes export cartels while protecting the
Canpotex potash cartel, FIN. POST (Sept. 30, 2010), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/cartelhypocrisy [https://perma.cc/YX4Q-DAHN]. The World Bank reports that “Global export cartels
increase the final price of K ([potassium] fertilizers in Sub-Saharan Africa by 29%.” WORLD BANK
GROUP, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: UNLOCKING AFRICA’S POTENTIAL THROUGH VIGOROUS
COMPETITION POLICY xii (2016), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/243171467232051787/pdf/
106717-REVISED-PUBLIC-WBG-ACF-Report-Printers-Version-21092016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PQK-E853]. See this World Bank Report generally for examples of combined
government or government-supported and private restraints.
62. Of course this does not mean that developing countries have sufficient incentives to promote a
world project. They do not. Their level of net incentives is much stronger for embracing regionalism
among like countries than for championing a global framework.
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markets, in particular the United States, have little interest in connecting the
world by a coherent trade-and-competition system. The system as it is, with the
division between trade and competition, and with national-only law that is
indifferent to external harms, suits them. But developing countries, especially
small developing countries, are harmed every day by a poisonous mix of crossborder state and private restraints. Moreover, developing countries are the usual
victims of foreign-originating anti-competitive acts. Finally, regional agreements
among similarly situated neighbors can offer something especially important to
developing countries—a trade-and-competition community that would break
down barriers and significantly increase competitiveness, without the worry of
exploitation by an over-sized partner. To be sure, large developed countries can
also gain in the competition space from regional agreements, but economically
they stand to gain less. For all of these reasons, with regard to the discrete two
points of light of this article, incentives of developing countries are better aligned
with positive policy than are the incentives of developed countries.
The existence of good incentives does not guarantee or even suggest that
developing countries will design the regional or global architecture of the future,
let alone craft a national competition law most fitting for them. The comparative
advantages have a very soft underbelly: overwhelming comparative
disadvantages. The very vulnerability and interdependence that could produce a
fairer, less privileged, more connected world also bespeak the essential
weaknesses that keep developing countries in check; weaknesses that include not
only lack of resources and reliable institutions but also capture by their own
vested interests and paralysis by their eternal fears of exploitation by powerful
trading partners.
Perhaps, however, exposing the two comparative advantages, as this article
has done, might serve a purpose. It might open minds to the opportunity for
developing countries to embrace a competition law that fits them, and it might
spur the developing country competition leaders to make the case for a better
architecture for regional collaboration and world coherence from the vantage of
less powerful nations.

